Searching for non-Chinese security cameras turns up the same shortlist every time: Axis, Hanwha Vision, VIVOTEK, i-PRO, Digital Watchdog, Pelco, Avigilon, Verkada and Rhombus. Every one publishes an NDAA Section 889 compliance claim, and none is among the banned manufacturers the statute names.

That’s the easy part. Only four of the ten manufacturers below say where their cameras are built. And on July 16, 2026, the FCC changed what "restricted" means for already-authorized equipment, which changes what an integrator can sell you (though not what you already own).

Brand alone won’t ensure you clear a compliance requirement. Here’s what will.

Which security camera brands are not made in China?

This is a more complicated question than it seems, because “made in” doesn’t have a single meaning. Headquarters tells you which legal system a company answers to. Manufacturing location tells you where the hardware was assembled. A US-headquartered company can build their hardware abroad, and most of these companies don’t clearly say if they do that.

Every cell comes from the vendor's own published compliance materials, listed at the end. "Not stated" means the vendor doesn’t name a location in those documents, not that the information doesn’t exist.

The above vendor compliance materials reviewed for the table are current as of September 9, 2026. Where a cell reads "not stated," the vendor doesn’t name a manufacturing location in the document linked here.

Why "not made in China" is not the same as NDAA compliant

Two things trip up buyers here.

There is no such thing as an NDAA certificate. Section 889 compliance is a vendor self-attestation. No federal agency certifies cameras, no third party audits and stamps them, and no registry exists to check a model number against. What you can get is a letter from the manufacturer stating that a specific model contains no covered equipment. A vendor implying it holds an NDAA certification is describing something that doesn’t exist. See what NDAA compliance means for the statutory definition.

TAA and Section 889 test different things. The Trade Agreements Act tests country of origin: was this manufactured or substantially transformed in the US or a designated country? Section 889 tests manufacturer identity: who produced it? Clearing one says nothing about the other.

Digital Watchdog shows how tangled that gets inside one document. Its TAA statement reproduces the designated-country list, and Vietnam is not on it. The same page then says its "TAA compliant products are manufactured in the United States, South Korea, and Vietnam."

Hanwha Vision rests its claim on the same ground, stating its facilities are in Vietnam and South Korea and therefore TAA compliant. South Korea is designated. Vietnam is not. Whether a Vietnam-built camera qualifies turns on substantial transformation, which is a customs question rather than a marketing one, and neither vendor addresses it. That’s why a vendor's sentence is a starting point, not an answer.

Key criteria for choosing a non-Chinese security camera

There are five things to weigh here, and the country of origin is only one.

1. Documented Section 889 status. A document naming the model you’re buying, not a claim on a web page.
2. Where the hardware is built, and by whom. Headquarters and factory are separate questions, and the table shows how often only one gets answered.
3. Data handling. Where footage is stored, how it is encrypted, retention policy, and whether the vendor will put data residency in writing. Clean provenance with opaque data practices only solves half a problem.
4. Firmware and patching. Patch speed, whether firmware is cryptographically signed, and whether vulnerabilities get disclosed. Supply chain risk does not end at the loading dock.
5. Supply chain traceability. Whether the vendor audits its own suppliers and will say so on paper. Most treat this as confidential, which is itself informative.

How to verify a specific camera's origin and NDAA status

You have a model number on a quote and a requirement in an RFP. Here are the six checks you need to do.

1. Ask for a model-specific attestation letter. Request a written statement naming the exact model and confirming it contains no covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment. A blanket compliance line on a website is not a document you can file. Add a Bill of Materials or country-of-origin certificate if origin matters to your requirement.
2. Check how narrowly the vendor scoped its claim. Pelco publishes compliance by product line; Verkada certifies per SKU; Digital Watchdog describes its products as "deemed NDAA compliant by the manufacturer."
3. Look up the FCC ID, and know its limits. Every device sold in the US carries one. Search it at the FCC's Equipment Authorization Search, splitting the ID into grantee code and product code. You get the grantee, meaning whoever holds the authorization, plus test reports and filed exhibits, though exhibits can be withheld under a confidentiality request. You don’t get manufacturing location, because nothing in 47 CFR Part 2 requires disclosing it. This is a "who stands behind this device" check, not an origin check.
4. For country of origin, read the customs rulings. Origin turns on substantial transformation, and Customs and Border Protection publishes product-specific rulings at CROSS. That is the authoritative answer when TAA is on the line.
5. Don’t mistake a marketplace listing for verification. GSA is explicit that on its Multiple Award Schedule, "MAS contractors certify the country of origin for each product which is displayed on GSA Advantage." Officers can flag suspect listings, but origin rests on the vendor's word. State and local buyers should also check their own state's prohibited-technology list, since several restrict manufacturers the federal Covered List does not.
6. Re-verify before renewals and large deployments. Suppliers change and production moves. A letter from two years ago describes a camera built two years ago, which might not be the one you’re installing today.

If you are evaluating Coram, ask us for a Section 889 self-attestation letter for the models you’re considering, and ask every vendor on your shortlist for the same.

What changed in 2026

FCC Public Notice DA 26-635 took effect July 16, 2026. It prohibits continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment, closing a gap that had run since the Covered List began: restrictions applied only to new authorizations, so already-authorized gear kept moving through the channel. Two conditions bound it. The equipment must have been added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, and authorized before the Commission adopted its 2022 rules.

Equipment you already own is not affected. The notice is explicit: the prohibition "does not affect the continued use or operation of previously authorized covered equipment; consumers may continue to use any device or equipment that they currently possess, if the equipment was legally purchased and maintains an existing equipment authorization." Importation and marketing are prohibited. Use is not.

One limitation matters if you run critical infrastructure. The FCC suspended the prohibition where equipment is used for physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, pending a new definition of that term after the D.C. Circuit vacated the previous one in Hikvision USA, Inc. v. FCC (No. 23-1032, April 2024). Treat it as unsettled.

A separate order landed on July 22, 2026. FCC 26-50, the Third Report and Order in a different docket, bars authorization of devices incorporating covered logic-bearing components, and treats a marketplace listing as marketing when combined with another activity such as warehousing or fulfilment. A bare listing does not trigger it.

Outside the US, the picture is narrower than it usually gets described. Canada acted most sharply, ordering Hikvision's Canadian subsidiary wound up on June 27, 2025 under the Investment Canada Act; the Federal Court dismissed Hikvision's challenge in September 2025, and the company says it intends to file a treaty claim. We covered the original order in Canada's Hikvision ban.

The UK's 2022 instruction covers sensitive government sites only, and in November 2025 the government reported every site originally identified had finished replacement. Australia's 2023 action was an administrative removal concentrated in the Department of Defence. There is no EU-wide ban; action sits with member states and municipalities.

Who actually has to comply

Section 889 has two parts, and the second might surprise you.

Part A, effective August 2019, bars federal agencies from procuring covered equipment. Part B, effective August 2020, bars them from contracting with any entity that uses it, whether or not that use touches the contract.

One qualifier matters most but gets dropped frequently: the equipment has to be used "as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system." A lobby camera may or may not clear that bar, so read the clause before concluding either way. If you’re already exposed, replacing Hikvision equipment covers the migration path.

The five are also not a closed list, and not covered identically: the definition reaches any entity the Secretary of Defense reasonably believes to be connected to the Chinese government, and Huawei and ZTE are covered for all telecommunications equipment while the other three are covered only for specified purposes.

Grant recipients are covered separately. Under 2 CFR 200.216, no recipient or subrecipient of a federal award may spend award funds on covered equipment. For districts this is a budget problem before a legal one: non-compliant hardware blocks grant eligibility.

A growing number of states have added restrictions through instruments ranging from statutes to executive directives. Louisiana RS 39:1753.1 is worth reading because it’s specific: it names the five plus subsidiaries and affiliates, and binds state departments, parish and city governments, public schools through postsecondary, and nonpublic schools taking state funds.

Vendors file affidavits, and a violation voids the procurement. If you buy for a city or county, our municipal work starts from those constraints.

What to do if you already own restricted cameras

The good news here: you’re probably not facing a deadline to tear anything out. The July 2026 notice restricts importing and marketing covered equipment, not using what you lawfully already bought. For most organizations this is a planned replacement, not an emergency.

That matters, because wholesale replacement is rarely the plan. In Coram's 2026 State of Physical Security Report, 84.2% of leaders said they could keep some or all of their existing cameras, and 51% said they could keep every camera they own. The instinct is to phase the deployment of new cameras; the constraint is which platform tolerates mixed hardware.

Settle that first. Coram runs on existing IP cameras supporting RTSP with H.264 or H.265, so cameras usually stay and the platform above them changes; MPEG cameras are not supported.

Footage records to a Coram Point NVR on your premises, which matters if data handling is one of your criteria. Daleville Community Schools moved more than 100 existing 4K cameras across and replaced the recorders instead of the fleet. Adam Jones, the district's IT technical lead, noted, "No other company offers this; every other company wants to sell you new cameras." If replacement is part of the plan, our platform pages cover hardware options.

If you’re interested in learning more about Coram’s cameras and software, request a demo here.